This paper analyses the effects of network externalities in strategic R&D competition. We present a model of two firms competing with R&D investments and prices in a differentiated consumer market. Buyers form firm-specific networks which can be compatible. A high degree of compatibility and large spillovers moderate price competition due to weak strategic value of firm-specific networks and R&D investments respectively. Asymmetry in product qualities brings out network effects that cancel out in conventional symmetric settings. The lower quality firm increases R&D and decreases its price as spillovers or network compatibility is increased. This happens when R&D and firm-specific network size have high strategic value.
Introduction
Network structures are pervasive in modern economies: people spend increasing amounts of time and money on internet services, organisations link themselves to other organisations with various cooperational relationships. At the same time, competition in many network industries is undertaken on various levels that mix strategic investments and price competition. This complexity generates interesting competitive …rm behaviour. In this paper, we examine the e¤ects of demand side network externalities on strategic cost reducing R&D investments. We augment a standard horizontal di¤erentiation model by introducing network externalities into the demand side and involuntary spillovers into R&D production. Technological change has been an element in network economics since Farrell & Saloner (1985) , David (1985) and Arthur (1989) , but the feature that technological investments are imperfectly appropriable has been overlooked. The merger of strategic R&D and networks brings up new kinds of …rm behaviour that re…nes the results of earlier literature.
Imperfect appropriability of R&D and its consequences on industrial competition, as well as the performance of di¤erent forms of R&D cooperation, in terms of welfare, have been studied by, among others: Spence (1984 ), d'Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988 , 1990 , Henriques (1990) , Kamien et al. (1992) , Suzumura (1992) , Suzumura & Yanagawa (1993), and Amir (2000) . De Bondt (1997) is a survey of R&D appropriability literature. In strategic investment games, the total e¤ect of R&D spillovers consists of a market expansion e¤ect that encourages R&D investments as well as a competitive e¤ect that discourages R&D. De Bondt (1997) generalises that the competitive e¤ect dominates the market expansion e¤ect, and therefore, spillovers tend to have a discouraging e¤ect on an individual …rm's willingness to invest in strategic R&D. Yet, De Bondt (1997) claims that the negative relationship may reverse with a small number of rivals and su¢ cient product di¤erentiation. Asymmetry between …rms can result in increasing R&D in spillovers. For example, if one …rm is better in appropriating R&D than other …rms, it may increase its e¤orts when 1 spillovers increase. On the other hand, e¤ective R&D that measures total cost reduction for a …rm, i.e. …rm-speci…c R&D plus the spillover bene…ts from other …rms, tends to be increasing up to a certain spillovers threshold. When spillovers exceed the threshold, also e¤ective R&D decreases in spillovers. Product di¤erentiation raises the threshold.
Even though the negative association between …rm-speci…c R&D and spillovers is the general result in the strategic R&D literature, other results have a tendency to be dependent on the chosen model set-up. Hence, many results appear not to be too robust. For example, Amir (2000) reports that the e¤ective R&D level increases in the d 'Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988 , 1990 set-up when spillovers are relatively small and decreases when spillovers are large. But, the set-up used by Kamien et al. (1992) produces decreasing e¤ective R&D for all spillover levels.
Network incompatibility may arise from many sources such as technical product features or personal tastes. Following Katz & Shapiro (1985) , the compatibility literature has focused on the technical interpretation and analysed private and social incentives for compatibility. Incompatibilities create implicit switching costs. Beggs & Klemperer (1992) show that consumer prices are higher with switching costs than without. Besen & Farrell (1994) interpret this result as a tendency of incompatibility to tone down price competition. Incompatibility represents a degree of consumer lock-in, which allows the …rm to charge above the price of perfectly compatible goods.
Even though Besen & Farrell (1994) leave some room for doubt, they report the literature generally agreeing on that incompatibilities reduce (price) competition. Bental & Spiegel (1995) analyse a network competition model with income-wise di¤erentiated consumers. Richer consumers are willing to pay more for a network of a given size. They show that consumers prefer compatible networks as market coverage is the highest and price the lowest under compatibility. The result, however, comes from free entry of …rms. In contrast, Shy (2001) shows how "compatibility is anticompetitive". The key to his conclusion is that, with incompatible goods, market share competition is the dominating feature, which drives prices down. Shy (2001) explains that, with incompatibility, consumers care about the price di¤erence between goods and about the sizes of …rm-speci…c networks. Under perfect compatibility, price competition is relaxed, since the sizes of …rm-speci…c networks become irrelevant as all consumers attain the bene…ts of the whole network.
Firm-speci…c market shares carry strategic value only under incompatibility.
It is interesting to expose the results of R&D models to network externalities. The combination is more than the sum of parts. In this paper, we employ demand side network externalities that resemble the telecommunications interconnection tra¢ c in La¤ont et al.'s (1997 La¤ont et al.'s ( , 1998 ) and Armstrong's (1998) models. We extend the game with a stage in which …rms choose R&D investments. Our focus is on cost-reducing (process) R&D and its implications on price competition 1 .
The main item of interest in our model is consumer interaction; each consumer gets utility from interaction with others. Two …rms each serve a network of consumers. Networks are vertically di¤erentiated and they may be linked with di¤erent degrees of compatibility. Firms choose R&D investment levels in the …rst period. In the second period, they set prices.
Network externalities are prone to produce multiple equilibria. Multiplicity causes that equilibrium analysis does not yield determinate predictions. We overcome the multiplicity problem by di¤erentiating consumers à la Hotelling (1929) . With su¢ cient price insensitivity, we get a unique interior equilibrium. We also consider a conceptually more interesting vertical di¤erentiation of networks. Vertical di¤erentiation is exogenous, which makes possible the analysis of asymmetric set-ups.
We show how asymmetric equilibria di¤er from a symmetric one, and when the asymmetric equilibria involve …rm behaviour which disagrees with the conventional results of strategic R&D and network compatibility models. Our model adds to the complexity in results of conventional models, rather than generalises them. The main …ndings are:
1. We derive a case where a …rm increases …rm-speci…c R&D investments under a marginal increase in spillovers: the …rm with lower quality product tends to increase R&D under an increase in spillovers if R&D and …rm-speci…c network size have high strategic value. This happens when networks are (almost) perfectly incompatible and spillovers small.
2. We characterise conditions where Shy's (2001) result "compatibility is anticompetitive" fails in its strongest form: the …rm with lower quality product tends to decrease its price with an increase in compatibility, again, if R&D and …rm-speci…c network size have high strategic value. Price decreases because the …rm chooses to increase R&D investments in order to cut costs.
Under competition, private and social incentives for network compatibility are aligned, but they di¤er for R&D appropriability in general. In the situations where we have the unorthodox behaviour detailed in 1 and 2 above, consumer surplus and the higher quality …rm's pro…ts move together and dominate the opposite change in the lower quality …rm's pro…ts with marginal changes in compatibility and R&D appropriability.
Findings from a symmetric model agree with the existing literature. Because asymmetry can produce unorthodox results, literature which focuses on symmetric equilibria fail to capture all prevailing e¤ects.
In section 2, the model is constructed and equilibrium is derived. Then the equilibrium is subjected to comparative statics analysis. We illustrate the unorthodox results with a numerical example. After that we bring forth some issues on total surplus. We conclude with a discussion.
All proofs of results are straightforward and are relegated to the appendix.
Model
We are interested in industries that present demand side network externalities and some degree of product compatibility. We will later formally propose a compatibility measure that incorporates personal tastes as well as pure technical compatibility. There are two …rms in the market, say A and B. The market is closed and the number of consumers …xed. Consumers are evenly distributed over a unit line according to their subjective taste preferences. Each …rm is exogenously located at one extreme of the line and the locations are inherited from outside this model, so that …rm A is located at 0 and …rm B at 1.
2 Some multi-medium software, such as Trillian, actually allows the users to log-on simultaneously to "host" IM networks of Yahoo!, MSN or AOL (among others), rather than being standalone IM networks. However, the multi-medium IM software incorporate features that are not supported by the host networks making them more than pure adapters. Usually the basic versions of IM software are free of charge, but more advanced features have to be bought.
Consumers have unit demand. The product yields intrinsic utility and utility contingent on all other consumers who have bought the product. The idea is that utility is driven by peer-to-peer types of services that enable interaction between consumers, and interaction utility can be split into two parts. First, the consumer gets utility from consumers who have bought from the same …rm as he has. This network of consumers is referred to as a "home network" and the utility is labelled as an "intra-network utility". Secondly, the consumer may also get utility from the consumers who have bought from the other …rm. This network is referred to as a "rival network", and the utility as an "inter-network utility". Interaction utility depends on the sizes of home and rival networks and on the compatibility between networks. Consumers who have not bought any product give zero utility to those that have. If the consumer located at s 2 [0; 1] on the Hotelling beach, buys the product, he gets intrinsic utility V (s) = v l (s) z; where v > 0 is a …xed base utility, and l (s) is the distance to the supplier. Transportation cost parameter z measures how well the product matches the consumer's subjective preferences. Consumers are assumed not to be constrained by their budgets, and v is large enough so that all consumers opt for purchasing the product independent of other consumers' decisions. As a result, the consumer's problem is reduced to choosing from which …rm he buys.
Firm i charges a ‡at rate p i : Net utility for a consumer located at s who buys from …rm i = A; B; i 6 = j is then
The principal item of interest in equation (1) is the interaction utility given by
For the consumer that has decided to buy from …rm i, intra-network utility is n i v i , where n i is the number of consumers on the home network. Parameter v i measures the objective value associated with each network member. It gives the usage value of services used in interaction.
This objective valuation is shared by all consumers and it is independent of subjective taste. A consumer located in the middle of the Hotelling beach can be indi¤erent between the goods in terms of subjective attractiveness but strictly prefer one good to the other in terms of objective quality.
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Term n j v i gives the respective inter-network utility from a rival network of size n j with objective value v i : Our speci…cation of network externalities implicitly assumes that the underlying social network characterising consumers'relationships is a completely connected graph. Each consumer is connected to everyone else.
The consumer gains at most equal utility from a single rival network member compared to a home network member. The rationale behind this assumption is that it is likely that similar types of consumers choose to buy from the same …rm, and that consumers interact more with people similar to them. In the absence of usage fees, the rival network is less regularly accessed A consumer, who has bought from …rm A, located at s interacts more with people located close to s (call these people s's friends). He also has a bias towards interacting more with friends who are on his home network. At the margin, where half of the consumer's friends are on his home network and half on the rival network, the bias in favour of home network is captured in t: If there is no bias between networks, we have t = 0: If, however, network brand determines perfectly with whom he interacts with, t = 1:
Our assumption of covered and closed markets, removes network expansion e¤ects of R&D.
An improvement in network compatibility, however, captures some forms of market expansion.
De…ne the e¢ cient network size as n i v i + n j v i (1 t). As t is lowered, the e¤ective size grows.
If networks are perfectly incompatible (t = 1), the rival network does not yield utility. In the typology of Besen & Farrell (1994) , perfect incompatibility makes the …rms compete for the market. In this case, …rm-speci…c market shares are important in consumers'decision making. The polar case, perfect compatibility (t = 0), produces competition within the market. In this case, consumers get the full bene…ts of the total network, and …rm-speci…c network sizes are irrelevant in consumers'decision making.
Consumers' expectations on network sizes are ful…lled in the equilibrium. The indi¤erence condition U A (s) = U B (s) determines market shares uniquely. The market share for …rm A is
The …rms'problem is to maximise pro…ts by choosing R&D investments and setting unit prices.
Investments in R&D reduce unit production costs capturing the idea of process R&D. Let x i be the autonomous, or …rm-speci…c, output of …rm i's R&D investment. We eliminate the case in which R&D spillovers would ‡ow only from the R&D leader to the laggard by interpreting x i so that it represents both R&D output and total input including all trials and errors. A fraction of R&D output, x i , is spilled over to the rival without any cost or compensation. The spillover parameter, 2 [0; 1], is symmetric between …rms. The e¤ective cost reduction for …rm i is then
Productivity of R&D is independent of spillovers, and the …rm's own and the rival's R&D are substitutes. The potentially undesirable possibility that one …rm can bene…t passively from the rival's R&D is not dealt with. A …rm can enjoy cost reduction even if it does not invest in R&D at all. The unit cost per sale for …rm i is C i = c X i , where c > 0 is assumed to be symmetric between …rms 5 .
5 Di¤erent approaches to modeling R&D and spillovers are abundant: for example, Levin & Reiss (1988) and Kesteloot & De Bondt (1993) assume imperfect substitutability of autonomous R&D and an industry-wide pool of R&D. Of other variants Cohen & Levinthal (1989) (variable learning capacities and intra-industry R&D spillovers), De Bondt & Henriques (1995) (asymmetric spillovers and R&D absorption capabilities) and Katsoulacos & Ulph (1998) (endogenous spillovers) are among the most interesting ones. See also Amir (2000) who looks at the di¤erences between d'Aspremont & Jacquemin 's (1988, 1990) and Kamien et al.'s (1992) formulations of R&D productivity. However, we …nd symmetry and the absence of industry R&D pools in our set-up appropriate considering the small number of …rms. We also consciously ignore other more sophisticated treatments of R&D and spillovers.
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The objective functions for …rm A and B are
where R&D costs are given by 
Equilibrium
The …rms maximise pro…ts (3) in two stages. In the …rst stage, they choose simultaneous R&D investments (x A ; x B ) ; and in the second stage they set prices (p A ; p B ) simultaneously. We solve the problem for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (NE).
Second stage best responses are
Reactions (4) are upward sloping, characteristic of Bertrand price competition. They cross correctly to produce a stable equilibrium 6 . Note that the reaction to a marginal increase in the value of rival product is tougher than to an increase in the value of the …rm's own product.
NE prices are
The …rm's own R&D causes a larger drop in price than the rival's R&D does, First stage best responses are
where A = 
complementarity, however, is ruled out by the second order condition for a maximum 7 . Since the reaction functions are linear, they cross at most once. Thus if there is an interior equilibrium, it is unique and corresponds to the ful…lled expectations equilibrium of consumers'problem.
NE investments are given by equation (7).
NE investments can be presented as x A general condition for equilibrium stability is Tirole 1988 ). This condition requires in the current model that A 2 (1 ) > 0. E¤ectively, this condition sets a lower limit for the transportation costs. The condition guarantees also that second order conditions for maximum hold. Hence, the following condition (A1) is required to hold in equilibrium 8 .
Using NE prices and investments, …rm i's NE market share can be expressed as
7 Strategic complementary and substitutability are de…ned as in Bulow et al. (1985) . First stage second order conditions require that z > 1 2
(1 ) 2 , A > (1 ), which is more stringent condition than the second stage second order conditions. Now, the second order conditions for the …rst stage rule out the case in which @x A @x B would be positive. Consequently, investments are always strategic substitutes. Unique strategic substitutability is a simpli…cation of the general tendency of mixed strategic substitutability and complementarity in strategic R&D investments. De Bondt (1997) states that, in general with quadratic payo¤s, …rst stage investments are strategic substitutes when spillovers are below a certain critical level, and strategic complements with spillovers that exceed the critical level. Here, there is no critical threshold in that sense. 8 Fudenberg & Tirole's (1991) su¢ cient condition for asymptotic equilibrium stability is Note that the denominator in equation (8) is positive by condition (A1).
4 Comparative statics
E¢ ciency benchmark
A competitive duopoly produces industry-wide R&D levels which are lower than the social optimum. We show this with a comparison between the competitive industry and a Ramsey benchmark. In the Ramsey case, we maximise consumer surplus conditional on the industry breaking even. When qualities are asymmetric, this may involve transfers between …rms. Consumer surplus
The Lagrangian of the Ramsey maximisation problem is
where is the Lagrange multiplier. Second stage optimisation of (10) 
In the competitive duopoly, the industry-wide R&D level is
It is evident that the competitive industry always produces socially too little R&D.
Symmetric qualities
We start the analysis of the competitive duopoly equilibrium with a case of symmetric qualities
. Symmetric …rms split the market 50=50: Market share e¤ects due to changes in and t are neutralised with symmetric qualities,
With symmetry, the …rst stage NE degenerates into a simple relationship between R&D and spillovers,
The two comparative statics that are of interest, namely 
The last term in equation (14) equals e¤ective R&D. Not surprisingly, NE prices increase as spillovers increase. This is due to decreasing investments in the …rst stage. More interestingly, higher levels of network compatibility are associated with higher prices. With some degree of incompatibility (t > 0) …rms are involved in competition for market share. This competition pushes prices down. Price competition is at the most intense level when consumer networks are completely incompatible (t = 1). Whereas the highest pro…ts are attained with perfectly compatible goods (t = 0). Incompatibility represents a degree of lock-in of consumers, which softens price competition, but only imperfectly. Despite consumer utility would look likely to increase as parameter t decreases; the bene…t is o¤set by the increase in prices. In this sense, the parameter t acts as a device of tacit collusion, similar to the interconnection charge in telecommunications models (à la La¤ont et al. 1998) . Finally, pro…ts increase in spillovers because of smaller outlays in R&D.
Asymmetric qualities
Like the NE investment functions point out, market share dynamics have a central role in the model. Therefore, it is useful to derive comparative statics for the NE market shares. Lemmas 1 and 2 summarise these statics.
Lemma 1 (i) The market share of the …rm with a lower quality good is increasing in spillovers
(ii) The market share of the smaller …rm is increasing in spillovers.
Lemma 2 (i) With su¢ ciently high price sensitivity, z < v A + v B 2 9 (1 ) 2 , the market share of the …rm with a lower quality good is increasing in network compatibility
(ii) With su¢ ciently low price sensitivity, z > v A + v B 2 9 (1 ) 2 ; the market share of the …rm with a lower quality good is decreasing in network compatibility
Because network compatibility is foremost associated with consumer's utility, and …rms'pro…ts depend on it only indirectly, it is worthwhile to study what kind of impact a change in the parameter t has on intra-and inter-network utilities, which equal to sv A + (1 s) (1 t) v A for …rm A's customers.
First, if the …rm's market share is decreasing in network compatibility, then intra-network utility is also decreasing in compatibility. Smaller home network yields less intra-network utility.
Second, a decrease in compatibility has both a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect on internetwork utility. These two e¤ects are
for …rm A.
The direct e¤ect of is always negative. If a decrease in compatibility increases home network size ( ds dt > 0), then the indirect e¤ect is negative as well. Smaller rival network yields less inter-network utility.
Consider a case with high price sensitivity (as de…ned in Lemma 2) and a reduction in network compatibility (dt > 0). The market share of the lower quality good …rm decreases. Its customers get a negative utility e¤ect through intra-network utility. They also get a negative direct e¤ect through the inter-network utility. Negative e¤ects are partly compensated by a positive indirect inter-network e¤ect due to the increase in the size of the rival network. If networks are relatively incompatible, the positive e¤ect is not very strong. It becomes stronger with higher compatibility levels. At the extreme, with perfectly compatible networks, the intra-network e¤ect is cancelled by the positive indirect e¤ect of inter-network utility, i.e. the terms with ds dt cancel out. Perfect compatibility eliminates the strategic role of …rm-speci…c network size.
Comparative statics with respect to spillovers
Conventionally, in strategic investment games, the dominant competitive e¤ect of spillovers guarantees that …rm-speci…c R&D unambiguously decreases as spillovers increase. Since, the market expansion e¤ect is absent in the current model, the competitive e¤ect should guarantee a negative relationship between R&D investments and spillovers. Even if this relation still holds in most cases with asymmetric qualities as well as in the symmetric case, it is not true universally. With asymmetry in the product qualities and high strategic value of R&D and …rm-speci…c networks, the disadvantaged …rm increases its investments under a marginal increase in spillovers.
Direct di¤erentiation of x N E A
with respect to gives the following formula
where
is the elasticity of market share with respect to spillovers 9 . Increase in spillovers always induces a direct e¤ect to reduce investments. There is also an indirect e¤ect through market share. The …rm with higher market share always cuts back investments since its market share decreases as spillovers increase. Smaller …rm's market share is growing in spillovers.
When its market share is su¢ ciently elastic, the positive e¤ect can dominate, and the …rm increases its R&D investments with an increase in spillovers.
Proposition 3 (i) The …rm increases its autonomous NE R&D investments with a marginal increase in the level of R&D spillovers, if the elasticity of its market share with respect to spillovers is su¢ ciently high dx
(ii) The …rm with a higher market share always decreases R&D investments under a marginal increase in spillovers.
(iii) The positive relation
> 0 is more likely with high quality di¤ erence, and with low absolute levels of spillovers. The positive relation is also more likely with low levels of network compatibility, conditional on su¢ ciently high price sensitivity.
9 Since consumers have unit demand, the elasticity of market share corresponds to the elasticity of demand.
14 The idea in Proposition 3 is that the smaller …rm can take advantage of the possibility to grow its home network (when t is large). The larger …rm always invests more in R&D than its rival, but once spillovers are increased, it wants to limit the leakage. It reduces R&D, which increases its costs and subsequently drives its price up. As the larger …rm becomes relatively less attractive, the smaller …rm can a¤ord to attack. It invests more. In the new situation, network externalities generated by a larger home network outweigh the quality disadvantage, though the smaller …rm remains smaller. Higher network externalities compensate for lower quality.
The comparative static for the NE price of …rm A is given by equation (16). dp
Proposition 4 There exists (at least one) threshold level , above which both …rms increase their NE prices under a marginal increase in spillovers. Below the threshold, the smaller …rm (in terms of market share) reduces and the larger …rm increases its NE price.
Since …rm size is directly related to the quality di¤erence of the goods, the …rm with a lower quality good decreases its price under a marginal increase in spillovers when < : Otherwise both …rms increase price due to smaller outlays in R&D.
Comparative statics with respect to network compatibility
In the symmetric case, network compatibility is neutralised in the investment decisions. The situation becomes more interesting with asymmetric qualities, which reintroduce the competitive nature of network size and network compatibility into the game. By di¤erentiating …rm A's NE investments, we get
Proposition 5 gives the equilibrium behaviour of the lower quality …rm. The investment behaviour of the high quality …rm is of opposite sign.
Proposition 5 (i) With su¢ ciently high price sensitivity, z < v A +v B 2 9 (1 ) 2 , the low quality …rm decreases R&D under a marginal decrease in network compatibility
(ii) With su¢ ciently low price sensitivity, z > v A +v B 2 9 (1 ) 2 ; the low quality …rm increases R&D under a marginal decrease in network compatibility
Consider an asymmetric case where
An increase in network compatibility results in a gain in intra-network utility for …rm A's customers due to the increase in …rm A's market share.
In addition, the direct e¤ect of the inter-network utility is positive as well, but the indirect e¤ect is negative. However, the negative indirect e¤ect never dominates the positive e¤ects. Hence, …rm
A's customers face a positive impact on their utility in total. The competitive position of …rm A is improved, which motivates it to increase investments.
Although the …rms increase prices with an increase in network compatibility in general, the opposite reaction is possible. A …rm may decrease its price if its market share is elastic enough.
Firm A's price response to a decrease in network compatibility is dp
With high price sensitivity de…ned as in Lemma 2, Proposition 6 summarises price changes.
Proposition 6 Let v A < v B ; then under a marginal decrease in network compatibility (dt > 0):
decreases its price when price sensitivity is high decreases its price when price sensitivity is low and 0
increases its price when price sensitivity is low and
(ii) Low quality …rm
decreases its price when price sensitivity is high and 0
increases its price when price sensitivity is high and
decreases its price when price sensitivity is low
Note that the higher are R&D spillovers, the greater must the change in market share be in order to obtain the positive result dp N E A dt > 0. In general, the case dp N E A dt < 0 is dominant.
Numerical example
We have derived two results that work against the general …ndings. The …rst one is that a …rm can increase its autonomous R&D investments if spillovers are marginally increased. The second result is that a …rm can decrease its price when network compatibility is marginally increased. terms of product quality. Consumers are relatively price sensitive as the transportation cost is set at a low level (as de…ned in Lemma 2) motivating the …rms to engage in harsher price competition as undercutting is more e¤ective. The parameter con…guration characterises a market with an incumbent and an entrant. Entrant's product su¤ers from early development phase problems, so that its objective quality is slightly lower than incumbent's. However, the entrant has established an equally attractive brand (captured in the uniform distribution on Hotelling beach).
Changes in spillovers
We …rst demonstrate the case in which
> 0 holds for the smaller …rm. In the …rst situation, consumer networks are incompatible, t = 1. This is the archetypical case for competition for the market as categorised by Besen & Farrell (1994) . Figures 1 and 2 show the reaction functions in both stages as spillovers change from 1 = 0:05 to 2 = 0:15:
The initial equilibrium E 1 ; corresponding to 1 = 0:05, is given by the crossing of the solid reaction curves. The equilibrium after the change is E 2 ; at the crossing of the dashed lines. Firm A has increased its investments. Firm B reduces its investments because an invested unit of R&D becomes strategically less e¤ective. Since …rm B invests more in absolute terms, its own investments dominate its behaviour in the second stage. Cut down of investments leads to a higher price for …rm B. The positive spillover e¤ect caused by an increase in …rm A's investments never dominates …rm B's investments. Firm A decreases its price due to an increase in investments.
Because networks are incompatible, home network has a high strategic value which compensates for (low) quality. Firm A realises the possibility to increase home network size as …rm B becomes less attractive.
In the initial situation, …rms' pro…ts are In the symmetric case, when networks were fully compatible, price competition was relaxed as …rm-speci…c network sizes became irrelevant. Hence, it would be logical to expect that as network compatibility increases, the unorthodox aggressive behaviour of the underdog illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 would soften. This in fact is true. Only the extreme case t = 1 and its proximate values produce the unorthodox behaviour of …rm A. The typical relation of decreasing R&D in spillovers emerges with higher network compatibility. As the parameter t is decreased, the elasticity of market share gets closer to zero, and any market share expansion triggered by a change in spillovers becomes too small to justify aggressive investment behaviour. With higher levels of network compatibility, home network size has less strategic value, and therefore the underdog wins more by concurring with the dominant …rm's strategy.
At the extreme when networks are perfectly compatible (t = 0), we have the archetypical case for competition within market. Consumers do not distinguish between home and rival networks eliminating any strategic motives for market share competition. Consider the same parameter set and perfect compatibility. Again, the change in spillovers is from 1 = 0:05 to 2 = 0:15. 
Changes in compatibility
The case where both …rms raise prices if compatibility is increased, is the most common case, which underlines the general result "compatibility is anticompetitive" by Shy (2001) . Still, we can construct situations where the underdog …rm has incentives to decrease its price under a marginal increase in compatibility. This happens only when R&D and …rm-speci…c networks have high strategic value. Price drop results from a boost in R&D output. Consider the same parameter set, as in previous section, with zero spillovers, = 0: Table ( 19) gives the model output for cases t = 1, t = 0:95; and t = 0:9: 
19 Firm A prices above …rm B, even though its product has lower quality. It can do so thanks to brand loyal customers (horizontal di¤erentiation). It does not payo¤ to battle over consumers located in the middle of the Hotelling beach; it is more pro…table to charge a higher price for brand loyal consumers. Competitive pressure from …rm B though destroys its pro…ts.
As we increase network compatibility marginally (to t = 0:95), we open up competition within the market, which bene…ts …rm A because of the large size of the rival network. Firm A's o¤ering becomes more attractive, despite lower quality. Firm A can increase market share signi…cantly by lowering its price. At the same time, …rm B increases its price in order to temper price competition. If we increase compatibility even further (to t = 0:9), then …rm A's aggressive behaviour is moderated and it concurs with …rm B by increasing its price. It is no more pro…table to …ercely compete against the higher quality …rm B: Note that …rm B's pro…ts are not monotonic in t: The large …rm prefers either full incompatibility or high level of compatibility, as there is a dip in pro…ts initially when we depart from perfect incompatibility.
If compatibility was further increased, …rms would further increase prices (tacit collusion effect) and pro…ts would be driven up. Firm A's aggressive pricing characterised above would be eliminated also if spillovers were large. R&D would be relatively too expensive with regard to the potential market share gain.
Surplus
We conclude our analysis with few comments on surplus. It was earlier shown that competitive industry produces too little R&D compared with the social optimum. The Ramsey surplus for symmetric qualities (v A = v B e v) is obtained from the optimisation problem (10)
CS R equals total surplus generated in the industry. It is increasing in compatibility and in spillovers.
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In the competitive symmetric duopoly, NE pro…ts of a …rm are
It is easy to see now that industry pro…ts increase as spillovers increase. This is because of cut backs in R&D outlays and subsequently higher prices. Industry pro…ts increase as network compatibility increases. This is due to relaxed price competition. Hence, private (…rms') incentives for compatibility and R&D appropriability are aligned with the Ramsey case.
Consumer surplus in the symmetric competitive duopoly is
It is straightforward to see that consumer surplus decreases as spillovers increase or as network compatibility increases. Both features are consequences of …rms'decisions to raise prices.
Total surplus in the competitive duopoly is given by W
When considering the total surplus, the sign of the comparative statics with respect to spillovers is not constant. Total surplus is maximised with = , increase in spillovers increases total surplus. In this region, …rms'pro…ts increase more than the consumer surplus decreases. With spillovers above the cut-o¤ point, a marginal increase in spillovers causes a reduction in total surplus. Firms'incentives for R&D appropriability di¤er from social incentives under competition.
Total surplus increases in network compatibility. The increase in …rms'pro…ts outweighs the decrease in consumer surplus. Hence, total surplus is maximised with t = 0. Private and social incentives for compatibility match. However, consumers would be better o¤ with incompatible networks and intense price competition.
The asymmetric qualities case examined with the numerical example provides similar results.
Consumer surplus decreases in spillovers and network compatibility everywhere due to relaxed 21 price competition. Total surplus tends to increase in network compatibility because the positive change in pro…ts dominates. There is also a spillovers threshold that maximises total surplus. The only region where these results break is the area where R&D is (almost) perfectly appropriated ( = 0) and networks (almost) completely incompatible (t = 1). This is the region where the lower quality …rm has unconventional behaviour illustrated in the numerical example. When spillovers or network compatibility is increased in that region, lower quality …rm aggressively increases R&D and lowers its price. Its pro…ts go up, but the positive e¤ect is dominated by a decrease in higher quality …rm's pro…ts and in consumer surplus.
Conclusions
How spillovers and compatibility jointly a¤ect …rm behaviour in strategic games with network externalities has been overlooked in the literature. Network e¤ects have also been overlooked by focusing on symmetric equilibria. We studied the interplay between demand side network e¤ects and strategic R&D. We constructed a duopoly model with horizontal di¤erentiation and exogenously given product qualities. Horizontal di¤erentiation provided us means to derive a unique equilibrium, which is needed to obtain determinate comparative statics. Exogenously given quality di¤erence helped to study situations where …rms start in asymmetric positions. An alternative, but principally analogous, way to establish asymmetric positions is via …xed installed customer bases à la Crémer et al. (2000) 10 .
The role of R&D spillovers and network compatibility in price competition has been covered in this paper. Higher spillovers have a tendency to reduce incentives to invest in R&D and push up prices. Network compatibility tends to moderate price competition by reducing market share competition. Both e¤ects have a similar background. Spillovers reduce the competitive advantage a …rm can get by investing more than its rival in R&D. Network compatibility reduces the strategic value of …rm-speci…c customer networks. Thus, the "tacit collusion e¤ects" dominant in pure price setting models carry over to two-stage games in general.
We also showed how a …rm may take up reverse actions as R&D appropriability or network compatibility conditions are altered compared to what the standard models would predict. Symmetry was found to support regular …rm behaviour. This is natural as the strategic positions of the …rms are levelled, which in ‡icts symmetric behaviour that cancels out. Hence, asymmetry is required if a …rm's behaviour is to di¤er from the norm. Once we considered asymmetric …rms, we found cases where the underdog …rm takes reverse actions compared to conventional predictions. As R&D spillovers or network compatibility were increased, the underdog …rm increases its investments and decreases its price. However, this unorthodox behaviour is not universal, even in asymmetric settings. The strategic variables must have su¢ cient power. Only when spillovers and compatibility level are low, such reverse behaviour exists. In that case, network externalities intensify the e¤ect induced by strategic investments. In contrast, if compatibility (or spillovers) are very high, the strategic value of …rm-speci…c market shares (or R&D investments) are diminished, supporting regular behaviour.
Although the newly found unconventional results are less than universal, their existence is interesting. Asymmetry between …rms is more common than symmetry. Consequently, …rm behaviour in industries with network externalities can di¤er from conventional predictions. In order to have it not surprising, the reverse behaviour should be seen as a re…nement to theory.
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The sign of the numerator depends now on the relative qualities (v A ; v B ) ; on the transportation cost z; and on spillovers . For a given pair (v A ; v B ) ; the sign of the derivative ds N E dt is di¤erent for high and low price sensitivity. Equation (24) (ii) Write the comparative statics as dx First observation is that whenever ds N E dt is positive, the sign of dp N E A dt is always negative. In such a case, …rm A always increases its NE price if network compatibility is marginally increased. dp N E A dt < 0 , ds N E dt > 0:
Next, consider the case when 
The derivative with respect to t is dp 
which yields respective comparative statics
2 ) dp N E B dt < 0
2 ) dp N E B dt > 0:
